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THE GREEK INFLUENCE IN ECCLESIASTES.

THE average intelligent reader of the Old Testament knows something of the long discussion provoked by the above named book, and the early hesitancy about placing it in the canon. He knows also that some modern scholars would question the authenticity of some portions as inconsistent; other critics would rearrange the material to secure logical order and consecutiveness of thought. But if the reader side with those who view the book as a diary of "confessions," like those of Rousseau or Marie Bashkirtseff, he will repeat that "to him who only thinks, life is a comedy, while to him who feels, life is a tragedy," and feeling is not logical nor consistent nor logically consecutive in its self-expression. The critical proposals mentioned need balancing with psychological insight.

Tyler and Plumptre have made the scholarly world familiar with a Greek element in the book, though a slight modification may be necessary. A chief interest has latterly centered around the question of date,—one group making the work belong to the late Persian period and a stronger group contending for the Greek period, about 200 B. C. Renan would date it as late as 125 B. C.—which would give a chance to E. J. Dillon, to find Buddhist influence in the book. But the historic evidence of intercommunication between Greece and Palestine is sufficient to account for the elements in question at a date before the rise of Buddhism. We may question if the psychological

unity of humanity does not account for all that impresses Mr. Dillon. The parallels are not sufficiently close and numerous.

Some familiar data upon the intercommunication of Greece with the Orient may here be grouped. Were Ecclesiastes the work of a traveled Hebrew, his contact with Greek thought might be put at a very early date, if the linguistic phenomena of his book did not forbid it.

1. Magnesite from Eubœa and teak wood from India are found in the lower levels at Nippur—approximately 4000 B. C.; a date pre-Hellenic and pre-Buddhist.

2. Sargon of Accad and his son Naram-Sin have left in Cyprus memorials of their rule—about 2800 B. C.

3. Assyrian conquest reached Cyprus as early as 1150 B. C.

4. Early Greek art copies Assyrian and Egyptian models, as shown by various recovered specimens.

5. Its mythology is similarly influenced: Griffins and harpies are Oriental cherubs and eagle-headed divinities.

6. The Greek alphabet, introduced from Palestine, and written from right to left, antedates 700 B. C., probably should be dated 1100 B. C. Ionic Greeks may have adopted it a little earlier: an ancient Asianic syllabary of the Troad being displaced, but lingering a while longer in Cyprus.

7. The Greek is very prominent in the East immediately afterward. Greek mercenaries filled the armies of Psamtik I of Egypt, of the 26th dynasty. Their inscriptions at Abu Simbel, nearly contemporary with Josiah, antedate Solon and the seven wise men of Greece. Hebrew refugees, despite Jeremiah's warning, sought shelter under the protection of their fortress at Daphne, a generation later.

8. Archilochus, the Greek poet, tells us that his brother served in the army of Nebuchadnezzar against Jerusalem,

B. C. 586. Nebuchadnezzar's attack upon Egypt about 570 B. C. was checked by the Greek garrisons of the Delta.

9. The close connection between Greek and Persian, and the Hellenizing of many enterprising Persians thereafter is a familiar story. Xenophon's 10,000 Greeks marched northward through Babylonia four years before Ezra set out thence to reform worship at Jerusalem.

For the intellectual life that might flow through these channels of intercommunication, we have the following synchronisms:

1. When Nebuchadnezzar was casting up his embankments at Jerusalem, the Orphic religious revival was shaking Greece and its colonies, and Thales at Miletus was making his systematic attack upon the mythical origin of things, and undertaking physical explanations. About this time Siddartha is believed to have taught in India.

2. When Haggai and Zachariah were striving to rebuild the Temple, Pythagoras was teaching in Italy, Herakleitos in Ephesus just afterward; Xenophanes had begun his systematic attack upon the anthropomorphic gods of Greece. Zeno, Parmenides and Empedocles had won their fame ere Nehemiah began rebuilding the walls of Jerusalem; and Socrates perished in 399 B. C., two years before Ezra began his reforms (Kosters).

3. Of the great humanistic religious reconstructionists, Æschylus was born near the time of Cyrus's death, Sophocles was a contemporary of Nehemiah, Euripides died soon after Ezra's reforms.

As Koheleth hardly shows systematic philosophy, but rather the gnomic reflections of one probably mystical and poetical in temperament, we need hardly give much attention, as Tyler does, to the later Greek systematic philosophers. But the earlier Greek philosophers were unable to shake off the fetters of centuries of oral expression and wrote in gnomic hexameters for popular circulation. These

are nearer the Hebrew "Wisdom," the Semitic proverbs, in method. The poet, rather than the metaphysician, expresses the heart of his people, and the Greek populace were familiar with many passages from their poets and gnostic philosophers. This type of teaching would be peculiarly adapted to the Hebrew mind. Koheleth shows us heart struggles rather than metaphysics.

Passing the first philosophical speculations of the Milesian school we find the Ephesian Herakleitos protesting against polytheism, declaring that the present order of things has existed forever, and will forever exist; change is unceasing, yet is by fixed measures and laws; the gods may not alter them. The eternal order was not made by any (popular) god or man. The Sun cannot overstep his bounds; if he did the Erinnyes would find him out. God is all things and in all things; he is day and night, winter and summer, war and peace, satiety and hunger. He assumes different forms, as when incense mingles with incense, vapor with vapor; and each man gives him the name he pleases. All things flow; we cannot bathe twice in the same river. Struggle and change must be forever; if they should cease, all things would pass away. For all things come by strife; war is the father of all things, and hidden harmony is better than manifest (i. e., is an incentive to action, stimulates men to search for it). For God, all things are fair and good and just, but men deem some things just and others unjust, and all things are absolutely destined. The gods are the mortals; men are the immortals, each living in the other's death, and dying in the other's life. Fire is the primal element; of it are all things made, into it will all things be dissolved. The senses are not always reliable; there are many illusions, wherefore it is better to follow reason than sense.

Xenophanes, the Eleatic (B. C. 580-500?) taught that God is one, supreme, all-perceiving, all-hearing, without

such body or organs as men ascribe to him ("If the cows had a god they would paint him as a cow," he said, ridiculing anthropomorphism). As for the visible universe, all things begin in earth and end in earth. Transmigration he ridiculed with the story of a man who told another to stop beating a hound, "it is the soul of a dear friend—I recognize his voice." Those who preferred strength to wisdom he ridiculed. An acute observer of nature, he added notes of fossils in the rocks as showing that the land rose out of the water. He gained as a pupil Parmenides, who managed to reduce the world to thought, since Thought and Being were the same. Righteousness for him, as for Eastern Ionians, is the world-ruling power and shall triumph over all. Being is one, homogeneous and unchangeable.

Empedocles asserted that man has little opportunity to acquire knowledge but rises and is borne away like smoke, thinking he has learned much and vainly boasting of the little he has found; nevertheless wisdom is to be pursued, though the secrets of the universe are far off and exceeding deep—not to be found out. As for the world, there is no *beginning to be* nor *end*, but only mixture and separation. Nothing is added to them and nothing is taken away. But all things come from *Love* and *Strife*, and *these* shall be forever, though *men* appear but a little time and then vanish like smoke. And when the limbs of man are united vigorously by love, then is the frame strong; but when strife prevails, then the limbs fail and fall apart and are scattered on the sea of life. The world itself is now in its period of strife. As to God, Empedocles held with Xenophanes that he is all-pervasive pure mind, without such parts as men attribute to him. Perhaps all things came from mind. Matter could not grow old or perish, but the *mind* became *weary*. As to the soul, he was rather Pythagorean, counting himself a present fugitive from the gods, and

a wanderer on the raging sea of strife, for 30,000 seasons apart from the blessed, having formerly been a maiden, a boy, a fish, and a plant; doomed to wander in this stage where are murder, wrath, diseases, contention and harmony, folly, truth, obscurity, birth and death, sleep and waking, motion and stability, many-crowned greatness and lowness, silence and voice. All these are only forms of change, yet there is no real change; these are only illusions to which our senses are liable. His problem then was to escape the domination of sense.

These brief summaries are for a purpose. They are the sources to a large extent of the philosophy of the Greco-Phoenician Zeno, 150-200 years later. It will be seen that they deal mainly with physical speculation; are alike in discarding the old Greek gods. Parmenides must be grouped with them. He denied the change of the Ever-One—this was only an illusion of our senses. None of these philosophers distinguished between the physical and spiritual, as we do; spirit and matter seem really one for them. But they were neither materialists nor pantheists, as we use the terms. Merely asserting the unity of God and nature, it is man's place to cast aside his illusions and to be at one with it and its purposes.

Again, it is seen that Empedocles possesses for us the livelier human interest, being distressed to know his own place in the cosmos rather than to give us a mere cosmology (compare Matthew Arnold's "Empedocles on Ætna"); and this, with the world-weariness of the quest, is the theme of Koheleth. The utter unlikeness of the latter to all other old Hebrew literature must emphasize the possibility of connection.

Looking now at the great tragedians, the other religious reconstructionists of the epoch, we find the attack upon the old popular gods more direct; or, let us say, more fervid, emotional. Since the Greek stage was the Greek

pulpit, and the drama developed out of religious liturgies and festival choruses that dealt with the legends and religion of the Greeks, as the Hebrew prophet drew upon the past of his people, these Greek humanists are of first importance for us. We shall find that God is more vividly personal for them, as he always is for the emotional or "lyrical" temperament; while the philosophic views just mentioned fail to emphasize his personality as distinguished from nature. The conception of the latter is closely akin to our stock phrase of "natural law." With the whole early Ionian school, from which stoicism was to come, natural and moral law were ultimately identical. They did not weigh the relations of each individual human personality to the divine, nor consider profoundly the latter's relation to the social order. Here we find the field of the tragedian and Orphic mystic.

The most volcanic attack upon the old popular gods is that of Æschylus. Writing nearly a century after the systematic philosophical attack of Xenophanes, in the throes of the Greco-Persian struggle, the titanic power with which he speaks is due in some measure to the fervid emotions of the time. Choosing the myth of Prometheus bringing fire from heaven to man, and giving a Greek etymology to the old Sanskrit title, he makes the Titan personify forethought, providence, intelligence, hope. For the crime of seeing that light is good and makes men wise, and for putting them in possession of the sources of knowledge, he is sentenced by Zeus to be chained to a rock on Mount Caucasus, and a vulture is stationed to devour his liver by day while it renewed itself by growth during the night.

Æschylus makes Kratos and Bia, power or strength, and compulsion, the personified agents of Zeus in this war of the cosmos with the soul. These agents speak their character. Sheer, unfeeling brutality characterizes their

every taunt of the Titan representative of the struggling mind. Dignified silence is the part of Prometheus. We are repeatedly informed that he is the child of Themis (Justice, Natural Law, or Eternal Order) and Zeus is a tyrannical usurper of the throne of heaven. Even Hephaestos who dares not disobey Zeus is in full sympathy with the sufferer he must punish, and thus addresses him while fettering him:¹

“High scheming son of right,
The woe of present evil shall oppress thee,
For he's unborn who shall deliver thee,
Such being the gain of thy philanthropy.
For thou, a god, not crouching 'neath the wrath
Of gods, on mortals hast conferred high honors,
More than just. For which offense thou must stand guard
Upon this dreary crag, in upright posture,
Sleepless, never bending knee, while manifold
Laments and bootless groanings shalt thou vent,
For Zeus's wrath is hard to be assuaged,
And every one is harsh whose rule is new.”

Prometheus, replying, asserts himself divine; and further, he foresaw too all this woe, yet dared it none the less. Kratos and Bia sneer at his philanthropy and wisdom that have but separated him from mankind—placed him apart from comprehension and sympathy. Prometheus keenly feels the fact and exclaims:

“Compassionating mortals, I was deemed
Of pity's meed unworthy; ruthlessly
Am I thus crushed;
To Zeus, ignoble sight!
Men's doom from mortal foresight I kept hid;
I caused to dwell within them sightless hopes.”

To Kratos and Bia this is incomprehensible. He surely had no foresight, or he would never have gotten into this

¹ Quotations from Owen, *Five Great Skeptical Dramas*.

plight. He disdains reply, but again assures others that he knowingly incurred this pain. Compare Ecclesiastes, "He that increaseth knowledge increaseth sorrow."

Yet are there soothing influences in the visible order of nature. The daughters of Okeanos, the fragrant spirits of air and sea, come to comfort him. At the touch of sympathy, his stoicism gives way:

"Would that in Hades, 'neath the earth,
Or Tartaros of unbounded girth,
Home of the dead, where darkness reigns
He'd placed me when in cruel chains
Impregnable he'd bound me;
That neither god nor mortal being
Should laugh when these my sorrows seeing
But now the plaything of the wind,
'Neath open sky am I confined
While foes may joy around me."

He says of Zeus, "Justice he keeps for himself alone" (i. e., he has naught but injustice for all others),

"Yet shall he need me; I, not he, shall triumph."

Not his strength, his brute force, but his injustice and craft is his power;

"But mother Themis, Justice, Earth,
Of many names one form, hath disclosed
To me the future, how it shall befall!"

* * *

"For somehow to each tyranny pertains,
This malady—suspicion of its friends."

Again the sympathy of the powers of nature is felt, but they seductively urge him to yield, though they cry out against the injustice of Zeus (compare Lowell's "Sirens," Tennyson's "Lotus-Eaters"). Life is so short—wisdom so little—pain so much; and Okeanos interposes, "Thou art

better fitted to advise thy neighbors than thyself, if one may judge by thy fate." But Prometheus responds,

"I will bear out my present destiny,
Till Zeus's mind shall cease to rage."

"Without me, men seeing saw to no purpose,
And hearing did not understand."

He has made civilization and social order out of ignorant brutish cave-dwellers, teaching them all things,—but "curing others cannot cure myself." The chorus (popular thought) interposes,

"Be not regardless of thy luckless self.
I have good hopes that from these chains set free
Thou yet shalt be not less in power than Zeus."

To this Prometheus answers:

"Not so are those things ordered by Fate,
Who all things consummates. But bowed down
By countless grievous woes, I thus escape
My chains and art is weaker far than fate!"

That is, his doom is that he must suffer still; his relief that he must still struggle for knowledge and truth; he escapes by bearing and daring; convinced that evil shall yet fall, he is stronger though bound, than the tyrant. This is the inspiration of Lessing's choice of search for truth, rather than truth itself; of Sophocles's "Toil conquers toil by toiling"; of Goethe's "Who comforts himself by ceaseless struggle, we can at last set free." Compare Koheleth's "This sore travail hath God given to the sons of men to be exercised therewith." Shelley and Byron have taken fervid inspiration from the same passage.

Prometheus declares the curse of Time is upon Zeus, who lacks Prometheus (foresight)—"I never will be his!" All his enginery will recoil upon himself. The chorus warns him of Zeus's preparations—"So let him do—all is

foreseen by me!" Hermes enters with supercilious demands. Prometheus retorts to this "errand-boy of Zeus":

"For thy base thralldom,—know thou this full well—
I would not barter my unhappy lot;
Since I deem better, slavery to this rock,
Than to be trusted messenger of Zeus!"

And this final defiance of the roused and rallied cosmic forces:

"Let fiery wrath
Of lightning double-edged be hurled on me
And vexed be ether by the thunder claps,
And paroxysms of fierce winds!
Earth from her basements let the storm winds rock;
Aye, from her very roots!
Let ocean waves and paths of heavenly stars
In violent surge commingle mutually,
Let Zeus my body cast with whirling fling
By Fate's stern eddies into murky Tartaros,
At least he cannot visit me with death!

* * *

O Majesty revered of Mother Earth;
O Ether that the common light of all
Revolv'st around—
Ye see what wrongs I suffer!"

We can hardly imagine the effect upon a Greek audience when their chief god is thus arraigned through the medium of one of their popular legends as a monster of wrong. Though accustomed to offer him sacrifice and vows daily, their greatest tragedian has assailed him as cruel, arbitrary, conscienceless, wronging innocence, striving to crush him who would help mankind. He openly attacks the idea that because Zeus is God he can do what he pleases and asserts the real divinity and immortality of man's ethical consciousness. Only Kratos and Bia maintain, before the liberty-loving Greek audience, that "none

but Zeus is free." Unselfish sympathy and service of man is superior to every despot, human and divine, and must ever suffer, but never die—like Isaiah's "suffering servant." The hero foresees that he shall live, and be vindicated, though he does not yet know how. One may compare Job and Habakkuk.

Prometheus maintains, in effect, that justice, humanity and sympathy are of mightier authority than the inexorable fate of the Greek tragedies. To the taunt that the light he has given men has not freed them from sorrow, he replies that wisdom and knowledge increase sorrow, yet nevertheless are the best gifts for men. So Koheleth concludes.

In the cool and silent contempt for Kratos and Bia, brute strength and compulsion, Prometheus expresses the Greek sentiment that "wisdom excelleth strength as far as light excelleth darkness." In saying that "sorrow but makes the learner to be lord," he again anticipates Koheleth. In concluding that strife and struggle are not merely inevitable, but the true, needful portion of man, he thinks like Koheleth. Freedom lies in the acceptance of one's fate, and conformity to righteousness, as Koheleth concludes. Men's conscious innocence and "blind hopes" (faith?) sustain them against wrong, as in Job's case. In his expression of ceaseless change that cannot die, with ceaseless pain for the wise, which the brutish cannot feel, we have the world-weariness of Empedocles and Koheleth—"Weariness of weariness, all is weariness." Asserting that there should be one system of ethics for God and man, he voices the favorite theme of the Hebrew prophet, though approaching the problem from the other side, asserting that man has some rights that even a god is bound to respect—a fruitful viewpoint for theological construction. More sharply than the Hebrew he asserts the authority of reason and conscience and ethical ideals. In this sense of individual power, Job and Koheleth do not attain to Æschy-

lus. Replying to the taunt of Folly for conferring wisdom and knowledge upon feeble creatures of an hour, who spend their wisdom in madness and foolishness, his assertion of "sightless hopes" conferred upon mankind means that true wisdom transcends the finite and visible, and includes anticipation as well as realization. He has a doctrine of social evolution—that he has made men out of cavern-brutes—which calls to mind Koheleth's "Say not thou, What is the reason that the former days are better than these; for thou dost not inquire wisely concerning this."

We cannot speak at length of the loftiness and moral sublimity of this drama of Æschylus, nor of its immeasurable influence upon the history of human thought. We may ask why, with an outburst so impassioned, with loftiness unsurpassed even in Hebrew literature, with disinterested philanthropy and intense unmerited suffering—did the Greek utterly fail—go morally and spiritually bankrupt in the degenerate days of the Seleucidae?

You cannot rehabilitate a dethroned divinity. Fallen Dragons must be set up every morning—and a sorry figure they cut. The higher Greek ethical ideals were left related "to an unknown God." For the masses of mankind, the character of their gods is inseparably linked with the idea or name of god; you cannot assail the old character and keep the god name. There was an advantage then with the Hebrew in starting with a divine name not known to the patriarchs, nor burdened with ancient traditions. Their first knowledge of Yahveh, that he sent some messengers and rescued them from a region not under his jurisdiction gave them an ineffaceable impression of his power, sympathy and unselfish kindness. Beyond that, they knew nought, and had to learn his ways. There was then less danger that advances in ideals of morality and humanity would have to battle with the supposed character of Yahveh. What this meant from the standpoint of possible religious

evolution is almost incalculable. The prophet could attack abuses with the claim that Yahveh was misunderstood. He did not by such attacks subvert all worship. The very fact that Yahveh for some centuries was deemed to dwell in Teman, only issuing forth to battle in hours of desperate need, lent itself to the end in view, and prevented early days of superstition from completely fusing Yahveh with local legend, to the utter ruin of the hopes of religion. Thus the Hebrew god could be kept in advance of the popular ideal. The reverse became true of the nobler of the Greeks. These last must borrow the Hebrew personality as a satisfactory radial point for their intellectual systems and a proper support for their strong individual, self-asserting sense of righteousness. For the final query of humanity is not merely "What is said?" but "Who says so?"

Shall we say that the corruptness of the Greek Pantheon was the blessing destined to correct the deficiencies of Hebrew prophetism? This is not said to be sensational. We know the turmoil and trouble in Israel, knowing of their national god only what was told by conflicting schools of prophets and priests, and with a sense of utter dependence upon special messengers, and ceaselessly looking for an objective god, and complaining that "He hideth himself that I cannot find him." But the restless Greek intellect, destined to teach the world to think, grapples with the problem of evil; and concluding it to be one with the character of the national gods, voices the volcanic explosion of Æschylus. The Greek seeks truth subjectively, appeals to his own conscience, his own sense of justice, his own humane instincts, his own hatred of ignorance, his passionate longing for perfect self-expression, his belief in the eternity of right, his own blind but deathless hopes. He arraigns the gods at the bar of humanity, and predicts his own victory in the strife, suffer as he may in the mean-

time. They may torture, but cannot destroy him. As Socrates said of his soul "You may bury me—if you can catch me!" And he will teach the later Jew, burdened with doubt, slave of the scribes, wearied with the yoke of ordinances and traditions of the elders, something of his own method of inquiring after God. Ask yourself, inquire of the light within. Return and commune with thine own heart. As Kingsley's Aben-Ezra says to Miriam, "Men have lied to you about Him, mother, but has He ever lied to you about Himself?" So Koheleth has learned this non-Semitic method, and returning and communing with his own heart sees some things clearly that the world-order seems to refute, or fails to explain. The Greek helps save the Jew in his hour of intellectual need. The individualism of Ezekiel had not reached to individual intellectual independence. The final priestly domination, akin to that of Babylonia, produced the tyranny of the New Testament times: accept the dictum of the elders or be cast out of the synagogue—"Learning to the bastile, and courage to the block; when there are none left but sheep and donkeys, the state will have been saved." Here again we may note the utter absence of the priestly element in Koheleth, and the great difficulty it had in getting past the arbiters of orthodoxy of a later time.

We may not follow in detail subsequent developments of Æschylus's attack upon the national faith. Sophocles, with unconcealed contempt for the gods in one sense, asserts a supreme righteousness as the final force in nature. He treats with mild irony men's pretensions to knowledge, the boasted strength that is only weakness, the self-congratulation upon good fortune when ruin is at the door. Though one live many years and beget many children, the days of darkness shall be many. The central agents in some scene of wrong at last confess "I am nothing—nothing!" With Æschylus, he holds to the right leading of certain inner

impulses as opposed to the laws and conventions of men or the oracles of the gods; and opposes Antigone, a poor and wise child, to Kreon, an old and foolish king. Outbursts of anger characterize fools; evil will achieve its own ruin, though often not till after many days. Heaven hates much speaking, vociferous worship, and hypocritical service; but the humbled penitent, though outcast from men, is "ushered forth from life, not with groans or sickness or pain, but beyond all mortals, wondrously." Sophocles adopts a vicarious doctrine; is sure of a future life, though he knows not what it is like. Present suffering is not proportioned to visible demerit, nor is the sufferer always guilty. The misdeeds of ancestors and the oppression, treachery and ambition of evil men occasion much suffering of the innocent. Yet the latter are sometimes overwise, and find their wisdom is a vanity and grasping of wind. Men conquer by enduring, and sorrow is a spiritual discipline. His conception of the power that is to be revered is more personal than that of the philosophers we have noticed. His theology seems that of his contemporary, Socrates—his inner divine light is the *daimonion* of the latter. He differs from Koheleth in being devoid of pessimism—he "sees life steadily and sees it whole," though the chorus of the people sings that it is best never to be born, or being so, to return whence we come as speedily as possible. His own faith in an ultimate overruling power is never shaken. In his idea of God is no anthropomorphism.

The figures of Euripides are more human, if possible; more pathetic. The feeling of pain is greater, the quest for knowledge more fruitless, temptation to evil more overpowering, and he is tormented by a sense of the pettiness of human woes. Hence arose Aristophanes's jest about "the rags in which Euripides dressed his heroes." One feels that the Greek nerve is failing, the Unknown God must soon appear. "Scarce one happy scene canst thou

find in all the life of man." His diatribes against the national gods are alternately furious or cynical. "Wert thou, Apollo, Poseidon, or Zeus, the Lord of Heaven, to make atonement to mankind for every act of lawless love, ye would empty your temples in paying fines for your misdeeds!"—a shot perhaps at contemporary priests as well as ancient myths. To a victim, "Avenge thee on the god who injures thee, and fire the sanctuary!" To an oppressor, "Oh, thy hard heart! Oh, the gods'—more hard than thine!" The altars of the gods protect alike the just and unjust; religion often cloaks an evil man.

Contrasting, the sorely beset Hippolytus (in Joseph's situation) declares, "To reverence God, I count the highest knowledge," a sentiment also found in Sophocles. The heroes of Euripides all cling to moral convictions, but he portrays the difficulties in the way of right living more seriously than his predecessors. One may perish in devotion to truth, nevertheless "it is better to slay thyself than yield to unholy appetite." There should be no yielding of the spirit to external compulsion. The righteous perish because of their righteousness. The virgin-goddess Artemis addresses the dying Hippolytus:

"No sin of thine hath thus destroyed thee!
Thy noble soul hath been thy ruin!"

Hippolytus: "Ah, fragrance from my goddess wafted!
Even in my agony, I *feel thee near and find relief!*
She is here in this very place, my goddess Artemis!

Artemis: "I have none now to tend my fane; *but e'en in death,*
I love thee still."

That is the climax of the Greek subjective search for God in a world objectively confusing. The Hebrew's objective method could never say this. See Job's recurrent complaint, that he cannot find Him (e. g., chapter xxiii); his voice is rather that of Ps. xxii, "My God, my God, why

hast Thou forsaken me?" We may see the inestimable value of the Greek truth; the dying Hippolytus prepares us for the dying testimony of the Greek martyr Stephen, or the Carpenter's calm in His hour of trial—"Nevertheless, I am not alone, for My Father is with Me."

This material is sufficient. Zeno and Epicurus contribute nothing, both really going back to the conceptions of Herakleitos of Ephesus, borrowing some things from other sources.

What is the central feature of this 200 years of speculation and skepticism with regard to old Greek theology? A protest against anthropomorphic and unmoral conceptions of God, and mythical cosmogonies. The animism that gave each feature in a Grecian landscape its animating nymph, dryad or oread, results in the philosopher substituting one spirit as resident in and animating all nature; our modern doctrine is that of the Divine Immanence.

What philosophical difficulty is met here? As the popular dryad could not be separated from the tree in thought, nor the tree from the dryad, each existing or perishing with the other, so the larger world spirit of Herakleitos, Xenophanes and Empedocles was not at first differentiated from the physical universe. Their emphasis upon the unity of physical and moral law anticipates the method of Henry Drummond, 2500 years. For them, *Themis*, "What is established" stands in the place of the Hebrew's "It is written."

Having the doctrine of supreme, inexorable law "without variableness or shadow of turning" as the key to the world order, the humanists consider man's place in this iron scheme. The cry of the human for a personality differentiates God and the individual soul from the things that are seen, gives the high faith of Sophocles, Socrates and Euripides, and opens the way for Plato's "music of the stars" that but ends in his longing for a Divine Man

who shall make plain what is still dark to him. Progress in a definite direction—evolution?—is substituted for the ceaseless round of meaningless change first glimpsed by the philosophers. Ceaseless pain is recognized therein, but its necessity as discipline affirmed.

We have seen the place asserted for the human intellect or soul; the asserted divinity of inner convictions. Socrates dies for them, like the heroes of Æschylus, and finds these subjective manifestations of divinity a sure sustaining power. Their authority is absolute and a basis of responsibility. All the humanists emphasize subjective evidence of immortality; none essay to paint the future life.

Thus in the "Old Testament according to the Greeks," some ideas are wrought out that were not evolved upon Semitic soil. Add to the overthrow of anthropomorphism, to an immanent as contrasted with a purely external God, to the value of subjective phenomena and data, and to the certainty that suffering is disciplinary not merely punitive, the primitive difference between Aryan and Semitic gods, viz., world or universal powers as contrasted with local or national gods. There was never a god of the Greeks, as there was a god of the Hebrews. But there was a quick identification of various local divinities with Zeus, Artemis, Apollo, etc., that showed the Greek power of generalization, and a fundamental notion of the unity of the Universal Object of man's spiritual quest—a notion involving comparative religion striving to free itself from the confusing aliases of the Divine, and a notion which we may question the unaided Hebrews' ability to attain.

Consider now *Koheleth*: It is devoid of the dominant Hebrew traits. It is without anthropomorphism, as even its later imitators *Ecclesiasticus* and *Wisdom of Solomon* are not. What other O. T. writing thus speaks of God? There is an absence of racial or local reference in connection with God. There are no historical references, no inter-

est in "the chosen people" nor in "the god of the Hebrews," no god of battles, Lord of Hosts, or God of Abraham, Isaac and Jacob. There are no marvels, signs and wonders, on the contrary, an unceasing steadfastness even in the wearying changes of the world order. The cosmological order, not the local, social order of the Hebrew prophet, is the subject of complaint. There is no interest in forms of worship, no question of orthodox portrayal of the Lord; no reference to "the law of the Lord," or "the instruction of the Lord"—"the way of the Lord"—in any Hebrew prophetic, priestly or wisdom sense. Let us emphasize the fact that every familiar form of reference to God found in other Hebrew wisdom literature is conspicuously absent. Koheleth's references are for the Hebrew, *sui generis*.

Is there then a God in Koheleth? In the first part of the book, you feel there is probably not; at the last, you know there is. At the first, there is no certainty of a power differentiated from the world order, as with the Ionic philosophers. At the last, all critics are so certain of such personality, that some have proposed to pare away portions as inconsistent or spurious. They are said to contain Christian, not Hebrew, conceptions of God. What is this but admitting Greek influence? For while illiterate people must generally think of God in Hebrew fashion, the *modes of thought* of educated classes remain essentially Greek. The whole method of "In Memoriam" is a familiar illustration.

What of the soul and the future, in Koheleth? As with the God idea, not a certain and lasting differentiation of it from the world-order at first; individuality and responsibility clear at the last. Reflection and conscience are Koheleth's salvation; he ever returns and communes with his own heart.

Is the final faith in God a definite return to "the faith

of the fathers"? Is there any exhortation thereto? We have already noticed the psychological difficulty in such rehabilitation. Had Koheleth been influenced by Greek humanists, he could not have returned to Yahvism or post-Exilic Judaism. But the Hebrew God idea would form a personality about whom to group Greek modes of thought. The ultimate God idea of Koheleth is often asserted to be the loftiest in the Old Testament. Hence some critics would pare it away. But considering the Greek method of approach to God, Koheleth will appear a unit. Every sentiment can be duplicated from Ionic philosophers and Attic humanists. Late Hebrew in dress, the book is Greek in thought. The hands are the hands of Esau, but the voice is the voice of Jacob.

Even the method of announcing the conclusion is a paraphrase of a Greek form of official announcement. Compare Æschylus, "Suppliants," 922 ff., where the king formally announces the local law to a foreign envoy: "Solemn is the decree of the popular assembly, and the nail has been driven through, that it may remain firmly fastened; it is not in tablets, or the folded leaves of books, but you hear it from my mouth."

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